Infrastructures are group-like objects that make their appearance in arithmetic geometry in the study of computational problems related to number fields and function fields over finite fields. The most prominent computational tasks of infrastructures are the computation of the circumference of the infrastructure and the generalized discrete logarithms. Both these problems are not known to have efficient classical algorithms for an arbitrary infrastructure. Our main contributions are polynomial time quantum algorithms for one-dimensional infrastructures that satisfy certain conditions. For instance, these conditions are always fulfilled for infrastructures obtained from number fields and function fields, both of unit rank one. Since quadratic number fields give rise to such infrastructures, this algorithm can be used to solve Pell's equation and the principal ideal problem. In this sense we generalize Hallgren's quantum algorithms for quadratic number fields, while also providing a polynomial speedup over them. Our more general approach shows that these quantum algorithms can also be applied to infrastructures obtained from complex cubic and totally complex quartic number fields. Our improved way of analyzing the performance makes it possible to show that these algorithms succeed with constant probability independent of the problem size. In contrast, the lower bound on the success probability due to Hallgren decreases as the fourth power of the logarithm of the circumference. Our analysis also shows that fewer qubits are required. We also contribute to the study of infrastructures, and show how to compute efficiently within infrastructures.
Introduction
One of the most important challenges in quantum computing has been the task of finding efficient algorithms for problems that are intractable on a classical computer. Following Shor's discovery of a polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring integers and solving the discrete logarithm problem [23] , the key ideas of the period finding algorithm were generalized and led to the framework of the hidden subgroup problem (HSP) [14] . The major algorithmic success in this context is that the abelian HSP can be solved efficiently by a quantum algorithm (while classical algorithms are inefficient). This quantum algorithm can also be viewed as determining the structure of a hidden lattice Λ inside Z n .
An important restriction of this quantum algorithm is that it only works for integral lattices. But, Hallgren overcame this obstacle in the one-dimensional setting by generalizing Shor's period finding algorithm to the case where the period is irrational [11, 13] (see also [15, 19] ). This enabled him to give polynomial time quantum algorithms for computing the regulator of a quadratic number field and solving the principal ideal problem. Schmidt and Vollmer [20, 21] and Hallgren [12] presented a polynomial time quantum algorithm for determining a hidden lattice in R n for fixed n. They showed that computing the unit group and solving the principal ideal problem in number fields of fixed unit rank can be solved efficiently with this algorithm. 1 In stark contrast to Z n , the success probability of the above quantum algorithms for finding a hidden lattice in R n decreases exponentially with the dimension, making them inefficient with respect to the dimension. Thus, an important open problem is to determine whether there exist quantum algorithms whose success probability decrease less rapidly with the dimension.
In this paper, we initiate the study of quantum algorithms for infrastructures. These group-like structures are hidden beneath the number theoretic details of the above quantum algorithms. They play an important role in the research on computational problems in global fields, i.e. number fields and function fields over finite fields [6] (arithmetic geometry provides a unified treatment of global fields [17] ). For instance, computing the unit group and solving the principal ideal problem can both be translated to well defined problems of infrastructures, namely, the computation of the lattice characterizing the periodic symmetry of the infrastructure and the computation of generalized discrete logarithms in these group-like structures. Both these computational problems associated with the infrastructures are not known to have efficient classical algorithms.
In this paper we focus on arbitrary one-dimensional infrastructures and give polynomial time quantum algorithms for computing the circumference and for computing the generalized discrete logarithms. One-dimensional infrastructures arise from global fields of unit rank, and include the special case of real quadratic number fields studied by Hallgren [13] and complex cubic and quartic number fields [2] , thereby providing further applications. Our algorithms perform better than the algorithms of [13] when applied to these problems. The proposed algorithms provide a super polynomial speedup over classical algorithms. In addition, we make several other contributions. Firstly, although our algorithms are given in a more general setting, they have lower complexity and a higher success probability than those in [11, 13] . In fact, all our algorithms can be shown to have a success probability that is lower bounded by a constant, which is independent of the problem size. For instance, our analysis shows that the success probability of computing the circumference is a constant and at least 10 −5 , in contrast to [13] which implies a lower bound less than 10 −9 and decreases as a fourth power of the circumference. It is also better than the result of [19] which is lower bounded by 2 −26 . Secondly, our results when specialized to quadratic number fields provide a simpler treatment of the computational problems, and can be easily applied without extensive knowledge of number theory. Thirdly, we introduce an interesting technical result that could have wider applicability in the analysis of quantum algorithms employing quantum Fourier transform. Finally, we make a contribution to the study of one-dimensional infrastructures by showing how to perform finite precision computations efficiently within the infrastructures. These are useful even in the context of purely classical algorithms for infrastructures. A natural direction for further investigation is the generalization of the proposed quantum algorithms for higher dimensional infrastructures. These are presented in [10] . This paper is structured as follows. We first introduce the mathematical preliminaries, defining precisely the notion of an infrastructure and the computational problems associated with them. We then show that these infrastructures can be endowed with a group structure and review the relevant results related to the embedding of the infrastructures into circle groups. We then introduce group homomorphisms that are key to solving the computational problems associated to them. We also show that these homomorphisms can be computed efficiently. These results should be of interest beyond the present context.
In section 3, we generalize the notion of periodic quantum states and prove a key technical result related to the analysis of Fourier sampling. This result simplifies the analysis of the algorithms and leads to a tighter bound on the success probabilities of the proposed algorithms. In this section, we give a quantum algorithm for estimating the period of a pseudo-periodic quantum state. This result could be applicable to situations beyond the current setting of infrastructures.
In section 4, we show how to set up periodic quantum states from infrastructures and use the quantum algorithm proposed in section 3 to estimate the circumference of the infrastructure. In section 5, we present the quantum algorithm to solve the generalized discrete logarithm problem.
Infrastructures
We define infrastructures and state the two main computational problems associated to infrastructures. We restrict our attention to the one-dimensional infrastructures.
Definition of infrastructures
We refer the reader to [5, 6, 8] for more information on infrastructures. Our presentation follows [5, 7] . Definition 1 (Infrastructure). An infrastructure of circumference R is a pair (X, d) where X is a finite set and d : X ֒→ R/RZ an injective function on X.
Injectivity of d ensures that no two distinct elements of X have the same distance. We define a function on the set X called the baby-step, bs : X → X as follows. Consider the following set
Let
We also define the relative distance function
Informally, the bs(x) gives the element next to x. The circumference of the infrastructure, denoted R, can be expressed in terms of this relative distance function as follows:
It is clear that bs −1 , the inverse of bs, is well-defined. Further, a group-like structure is imposed on the set X by means of a binary operator, called the giant-step. Consider the set
Let f x,y = min S x,y . Then gs : X × X → X is defined as:
We define the relative distance function ∆ gs as:
The giant-step is commutative, but not associative. It is "almost associative" in the sense that for two arbitrary elements x, y ∈ X the giant-step gives an element z ∈ X whose distance satisfies
In infrastructures arising out of quadratic number fields the elements of the infrastructure correspond to the principal reduced ideals of the number field. The distance function is the norm of the ideals. One can cycle through these ideals using the so-called reduction operator [15] ; this function corresponds to the baby-step. One can also define the product of ideals which after reduction corresponds to the giant-step, see [15] .
The definitions of bs and gs and the relative distance functions ∆ bs and ∆ gs may suggest that we need R and the distance function d to be able to compute them. However, this is not the case. These functions can be computed efficiently without the knowledge of R or the distance function d. To illustrate this point, let us explain how (discrete) infrastructures can be considered as generalizations of finite cyclic groups.
Definition 2 (Discrete infrastructure). An infrastructure is said to be discrete if its circumference R is a positive integer and its distance function d is integer-valued, i.e., d : X ֒→ Z/RZ.
Example 1 (Finite cyclic group). Suppose G = g is a finite cyclic group of order R and generated by g. Then we can form an infrastructure out of G as follows. We let X = G and define d(h) = log g h, for any h ∈ G, since every element h ∈ G is of the form g d(h) for some d(h) ∈ Z. The baby step bs of the infrastructure corresponds simply to multiplication of elements x by the generator g, while the giant step gs corresponds to the multiplication of two elements x and y in G. The relative distance functions ∆ bs and ∆ gs are constant and take on the values 1 and 0, respectively.
We can now interpret the order of G as the circumference of the infrastructure. The distance function d(x) corresponds to the discrete logarithm of the element x with respect to the base g. This example makes it clear why we cannot necessarily determine the circumference and the distance function efficiently, even though we can efficiently evaluate the baby and giant steps and their corresponding distance functions.
Computational problems
The main computational problems related to infrastructures are the computation of the circumference and the computation of generalized discrete logarithms.
We consider only infrastructures that satisfy the assumptions below. These are necessary to be able to carry out basic arithmetic operations in infrastructures in polynomial time. The cost is measured with respect to the input problem size n.
A1) The circumference satisfies R ≤ 2 poly(n) . A2) Any element x ∈ X can be represented by a bit string of length poly(n).
A3) The elements bs(x), bs −1 (x), gs(x, y) can be determined in time poly(n) for all x, y ∈ X.
A4) The relative distances ∆ bs (x) and ∆ gs (x, y) cannot necessarily be computed exactly. We only obtain approximate values∆ bs (x) and∆ bs (x, y) with
in time 2 poly(n, m). A5) The minimum distance d min between any two elements of the infrastructure is bounded from below by
A6) The maximum distance d max between any two elements of the infrastructure is bounded from above by
A7) There exists a positive integerk ≤ poly(n) and a positive (rational) number dk ≥ poly(n) such that for all x ∈ X we havek
where bs i denotes the i-fold application of bs. In words, anyk consecutive elements span a distance of a least dk.
We emphasize that these assumptions are not restrictive; in fact, they are routinely made in the work on infrastructures. We have spelt them out explicitly for expository reasons. In particular, infrastructures arising from quadratic number fields satisfy all the assumptions made above; further justification for these assumptions for number fields is provided below. The first three assumptions are obvious. The relative distances ∆ bs and ∆ gs could be arbitrary real numbers and, thus, we cannot always obtain the exact values. Assumption A4 is made because we cannot perform arithmetic with arbitrary real numbers. Assumptions A5 -A7 ensure that we can compute in certain circle groups associated to infrastructures and evaluate certain homomorphisms into these groups efficiently in time poly(n).
The computational problems in infrastructures are :
• Computation of the circumference:
determine an m-bit approximation of the circumference R
• Generalized discrete logarithm problem:
given an element y ∈ X, determine an m-bit approximation of d(y)
The main contributions of this work are efficient quantum algorithms for infrastructures satisfying assumptions A1 -A7. These algorithms make it possible to determine ⌊R⌉ and ⌊d(y)⌉ in time poly(n), where the notation ⌊r⌉ means either the floor or ceiling of the real number r. Simple classical post processing allows us to obtain efficiently m-bit approximations from these integral approximations. For the sake of completeness, we prove later how this can be accomplished.
We now justify the validity of the above assumptions in the case of infrastructures from number fields of unit rank 1 (such number fields give rise to one-dimensional infrastructures).
A1) This is shown in [18] (see also [1] ). A2) This is shown in [24, Corollary 3.7] . A3) In [2] , it is shown that the baby steps and giant steps can be computed in O(D ǫ ) for arbitrary ǫ > 0 (where D is the absolute value of the discriminate, which is bounded by 2 poly(n) ). However, if one traces through their references and updates the analysis of the running time, one finds that everything is polynomial in log(D) and not just subexponential [9] . A4) This assumption is valid since one can approximate logarithms of absolute values of elements in number fields whose size is polynomially bounded in n. A5) In [22, Example 9.4] , it is shown that d min can be of size 1/2 poly(n) . In [9] , Fontein informed us that A5 holds in general. A6) This is shown in [2, Proposition 2.
The infrastructures from function fields are always discrete. This means that there are no issues with finite precision. Therefore, the above computational problems can be solved directly with the standard hidden subgroup approach. This is because the circle groups corresponding to discrete infrastructures are just finite cyclic groups. In [9] , Fontein informed us that the relevant assumptions also hold in infrastructures from finite fields.
Circle groups from infrastructures
We now show that infrastructures naturally give rise to circle groups that are isomorphic to R/RZ. This isomorphism is the key to solving the two computational problems in quantum polynomial time. Here and in the next two subsections, we assume that we can compute ∆ bs and ∆ gs exactly.
Picture the elements of X to be embedded in a circle of circumference R as follows. They are placed along the circle starting with x 0 at the topmost point of the circle and then moving clockwise. Their position is determined by the distance function d. For instance, the element x i is associated to the point d(x i ) on the circle as depicted in figure 1.
This embedding alone does not yet give rise to a valid group structure because d(
To obtain a group, we start with the set X × R and the map ψ : X × R → R/RZ defined by
for all (x, f ) ∈ X × R. We call this the absolute distance of the pair (x, f ).
For each d ∈ R/RZ, there exist infinitely many pairs (x, f ) ∈ X × R with ψ(x, f ) = d. To avoid this infinitude, we continue by defining the equivalence relation ≡ on X × R: two pairs (x, f ), (y, g) ∈ X × R are said to be equivalent if and only if ψ(x, f ) = ψ(y, g) (which is the same
. We denote the equivalence class of (x, f ) by [x, f ]. Now the set X × R/ ≡ can be endowed with a group structure as follows.
Proposition 1. The absolute distance map ψ in equation (10) is a group isomorphism from G := X × R/ ≡ to R/RZ, where the (commutative) group operation on G is defined by
for arbitrary pairs (x, f ), (y, g) ∈ X × R.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We just verify that ψ is a group homomorphism. Letting
Group arithmetic based on f -representations
We have to use "nice" representatives for the equivalence classes of G to be able to compute within this group efficiently. To this end, we introduce f -representations. Intuitively, the f -representations fill in the missing points in the circle R/RZ, i.e., the set of points (R/RZ) \ d(X).
We denote the set of all f -representations by Rep(I).
The following lemma was shown in [5] (see Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 therein) in a slightly less general setting. We include this lemma for completeness. An important aspect of this lemma is that the group operation can be realized without having any knowledge of R or the distance function d (except for the knowledge that is is revealed indirectly through the particular interplay of functions bs, gs, ∆ bs , and ∆ gs ).
We mention that for arbitrary infrastructures, neither this lemma nor any simple method make it possible to compute inverses in G. However, in the case of infrastructures in global fields there is an efficient classical way to compute (approximate) f -representations of inverses in the corresponding circle groups.
Lemma 2. The group operation in G can be efficiently realized by using f -representations to encode the equivalence classes. More precisely, it takes at mostk⌈2d max /dk⌉ = poly(n) invocations of baby steps to obtain the f -representation corresponding to the sum of two elements of G.
In general, the pair (
The task now is to find the f -representation that encodes the same equivalence class in G as (x ′′ , f ′′ ). We use the bounds
where d max is the maximum distance between two consecutive elements of the infrastructure.
If f ′′ ≤ 0, then we iteratively replace (x ′′ , f ′′ ) with (bs −1 (x ′′ ), f ′′ + ∆ bs (x ′′ )) until it just becomes positive. If f ′′ ≥ 0, then we iteratively replace (x ′′ , f ′′ ) with (bs(x ′′ ), f ′′ −∆ bs (x ′′ )) until it is minimal while being nonnegative. Observe that this reduction process preserves the absolute distance. Moreover, it takes at mostk⌈2d max /dk⌉ = poly(n) steps to obtain to the canonical representative in Rep(I).
From now on, we identify G with Rep(I) and use (x, f ) ∈ Rep(I) to denote the group elements instead of [x, f ] to simplify notation.
The corollary below is a simple consequence of the above lemma. We state it explicitly because this result it is extensively used in the quantum algorithms.
Corollary 3 (Double & multiply).
Let (x, f ) ∈ G be an arbitrary group element and a ∈ Z an arbitrary nonnegative integer. Then, it takes at most O(k⌈2d max /dk⌉ log(a)) = poly(n) log(a) invocations of baby steps and at most O(log(a)) invocations of giant steps to obtain the f -representation corresponding to a · (x, f ).
Proof. The action of Z on the commutative group G is defined by
Consider the special case of computing a · (x, f ) for a = 2 i with some i. This takes at most O(i) steps:
In each step, we apply the above lemma to ensure that (
with at most i additions. We again use the above lemma to ensure that the partial sums are valid f -representations.
In total, the whole process takes at most O(log(a)) giant-steps and O(k⌈2d max /dk⌉ log(a)) babysteps.
Group homomorphisms from R and Z × R into circle groups
In this subsection, we continue to assume that we can determine the functions ∆ bs and ∆ gs exactly, and compute with arbitrary real numbers. In the next subsection, we will relax this assumption. Definition 4. Let h : R → G be the surjective group homomorphism, where h(r) is defined to be the unique f -representation
Recall that we define the distance function
The statement of following lemma is obvious. We formulate it explicitly since it provides the intuition required to understand the quantum algorithm for computing the circumference.
Lemma 4.
The kernel of h is equal to RZ. Thus, h is a periodic function on R with period R.
where B is an arbitrary (but fixed) positive real number. Then, we can determine the exact value h(r) using O(log(B)) giant-steps and O(log(B)k⌈2d max /dk⌉) = O(log(B)poly(n)) baby-steps under the assumption that ∆ bs and ∆ gs can be computed exactly.
Proof. In general, (x 0 , r) is not a valid f -representation. Thus, we need to find the corresponding f -representation. If r is small and positive, then we can use baby-steps to find it with at most k⌈r/dk⌉ invocations. If r is large, then the baby-step method is not efficient anymore. We have to use giant-steps as well. The idea is to use the double and multiply technique of Corollary 3. Let xk = bsk(x 0 ).
is at most within a distance of d(xk)/2 from r. Thus we can find h(r) by using no more thank additional invocations of either bs or bs −1 . The overall time complexity of evaluating h(r) is therefore O(log(B)k⌈2d max /dk⌉) = O(log(B)poly(n)), since d max andk are O(poly(n) by assumptions A6 and A7.
Similar ideas can be applied when r is negative. The method proposed in Lemma 5 relies essentially on the group arithmetic of G and thus is quite different from a generalization of the binary search method.
Definition 5. Let x ∈ X be an arbitrary (but fixed) element of the infrastructure. Let g : Z × R → G be the surjective homomorphism, where g(a, r) is defined to be the unique f -representation corresponding to a · (x, 0) + h(r) .
We note that g(a, b) is same as the f -representation of h(ad(x) + b), where d(x) is the distance of x.
The following statement on the kernel of the homomorphism g is obvious.
Lemma 6. The kernel of the above homomorphism g is equal to
Corollary 7. Let A be an arbitrary positive integer and B an arbitrary positive real number. Then, we can determine the exact value g(a, b) for all pairs (a, r) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , A − 1} × [0, B] in time O((log A + log B)poly(n)) under the assumption that ∆ bs and ∆ gs can be computed perfectly.
Proof. By definition g(a, r) = a · (x, 0) + h(r). The computation of a · (x, 0) can be performed in O(log(A)k⌈2d max /dk⌉) = O(log(A)poly(n)) time by Corollary 3, while the computation of h(r) can be performed in O(log(B)k⌈2d max /dk⌉) = O(log(B)poly(n)) time by Lemma 5. The final group addition in G takes at mostk = poly(n) baby-steps, by Lemma 2.
2.6 Efficient approximate group arithmetic and evaluation of the homomorphisms from R and Z × R
The previous assumption that we can compute ∆ bs and ∆ gs and represent arbitrary real numbers is clearly an idealization. We made this assumption at first because we can explain the intuition in a simpler and more elegant way when the homomorphisms h and g are perfect. We now drop this assumption and work instead with the approximate versions∆ bs and∆ gs .
Let L be some large positive integer. We only consider evaluation points r that are rational numbers with denominator L.
Let h(r) = (x, f ) be the perfect f -representation with (x, f ) ≡ (x 0 , r). We can only determine an approximateh(r) = (x,f ) ∈ X × R of h(r). This approximation can be realized efficiently and has the following two properties:
P1. The first component is off at most by either a baby-step backward or forward, i.e.,x ∈ {bs −1 (x), x, bs(x)}.
P2. If we have the promise that
holds, then the first component is correct, i.e.,x = x, and the second componentf satisfies
Later, we will show that all evaluation points r necessary for the quantum algorithm are such that the condition in equation (14) holds with high probability by adding a random shift to the evaluation points.
Lemma 8 (Approximate homomorphismh). Let L be a positive integer with d min > 1/L. We consider only evaluation points of the form r = k/L with r < B. Let h(r) = (x, f ) be the perfect f -representation. Then, we can compute an approximate pairh(r) = (x,f ) that satisfies P1, P2. The running time is poly(log(B), log(L), n).
Proof.
We analyze what happens if we run the algorithm in Lemma 5, but now rely on the approximate versions∆ bs and∆ gs . Recall that the parameter m characterizes the precision of the approximations. The maximal deviation between the approximate and perfect values is smaller than 1/2 m .
We used acc (·) to denote the corresponding approximate accumulated distances of the (intermediate) f -representations and their first components. We use d acc (·) to denote the correct accumulated distance of the representations and elements (these distances exist even though we cannot always compute them). The accumulated distances are not taken modulo R and take into account how the f -representation is generated. A key observation that we need in the proof is that
The characterizing condition of the perfect f -representation is
We can only guaranteed
for the approximate pair (x,f ).
Assume that m has been chosen to be sufficiently large so that
holds. Together with equation (17) this implies
This condition onx is weaker than the condition of the perfect x in equation (16) . But since 1/2 m < 1/L < d min we must havex ∈ {bs −1 (x), x, bs (x)}, depending on which of the three cases
We cannot have a deviation by more than one baby-step backward or forward because otherwise equation (17) would not be satisfied.
If we know that f satisfies
L , then we can conclude thatx = x must hold. This is because the first and third cases are excluded. The condition onf is automatically satisfied in this case sincef = r −d acc (x), which is the same as r −d acc (x).
We now show how to choose m so that the condition in equation (17) holds. The algorithm in Lemma 5 has two steps. In the first step, we compute a · (xk, 0), where a = [r/d(xk)]. This gives us a representation (x ′ , f ′ ), such that
Then we apply a sequence of baby-steps to obtain an f -representation (x, f ), which satisfies
Working with∆ bs and∆ gs , in the first step we actually compute (
Let us analyze the error in this computation. The computation ofã · (xk, 0) itself can be broken down into two parts: (i) computation of representations of the form (x (i) ,f (i) ) which approximate 2 i (xk, 0) and (ii) summing O(logã) such representations.
The error at the very beginning e 0 satisfies
Note thatd acc (x (0) ) ≥ dk holds because if we get a value strictly smaller than dk we can replace it by dk, because of A7. The error in the ith step
The recursion relation can be easily explained by considering equation (12) . The first term is due to the fact that the error inf (i−1) is multiplied by 2, the second term is due to one giant-step, and the third term due to O(k⌈2d max /dk⌉) baby-steps used to obtain a valid f -representation. This implies
In order to obtain (x ′ ,f ′ ), we have to sum O(logã) such f -representations, where i varies from 0 to logã − 1. Each sum adds an additional error term due to the giant step and the baby-steps used for reduction. Therefore the error at the end of the first step is given by
where we used the fact thatã ≤ r/dk + 1. The f -representation (x ′ , f ′ ) is at most at a distance 3 of d maxk from r. Thus (x ′ ,f ′ ) is at most a distance of (e ′ + d maxk ) from r and we need to take at mostk (e ′ + d maxk )/dk baby-steps to obtain (x,f ).
The error in the accumulated distances of the final representation (x,f ) is given bỹ
The dominant term in the error is the first term e ′ , as it is proportional to r, while the second term is proportional to r/2 m and therefore does not contribute too much as m is large. We can make the error smaller than 1/2L as required in equation (18) by choosing m = poly(log(B), log(L)).
The proof does not actually require that the evaluation points are of the form k/L.
Analogous results hold for the homomorphism g. We state them without proof since the above argument can be easily adapted.
Let g(a, r) = (x, f ) be the perfect f -representation with (x, f ) ≡ (x 0 , r). We can only determine an approximateg(a, r) = (x,f ) ∈ X × R of g(a, r). This approximation can be realized efficiently and has the properties P1, P2.
Lemma 9 (Approximate homomorphismg). Let L be a positive integer with d min > 1/L. We consider only evaluation points of the form (a, r) with a ∈ {0, 1,
Let g(a, r) = (x, f ) be the perfect f -representation. Then, we can compute an approximate pair g(a, r) = (x,f ) that satisfies P1, and P2. The running time is poly(log(A), log(B), log(L), n).
3 Quantum algorithm for approximating the period of pseudo periodic states
In this section we generalize the notion of periodic states introduced in [16] . We assume that the quantum states are elements of a q-dimensional complex Hilbert space, denoted by C q .
Pseudo-periodic states
Definition 6 (Periodic state). A quantum state in C q is periodic with period r ∈ Z at offset k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} if it is of the form
where p = ⌊(q − k − 1)/r + 1⌋. We denote a periodic state with period r at offset k by |ψ k,r .
Periodic states can be created by the evaluation of injective functions over a uniform superposition.
To be more precise, we create the state |ψ = q −1/2 q−1 i=0 |i |f (i) , and measure the second register. We assume that f is periodic with period r. It is possible to recover the period r by means of Fourier sampling. In fact, the period can be recovered even when r is irrational. For this reason, we generalize these periodic states to a larger class of quantum states called the pseudo-periodic states.
Definition 7 (Pseudo-periodic state). A pseudo-periodic state in C q , with possibly irrational period r ∈ R, is of the form:
where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊r⌋} and p is the largest integer such that ⌊k + (p − 1)r⌉ ≤ (q − 1).
Please note that ⌊x⌉ can be either ⌊x⌋ or ⌈x⌉, therefore, p take any integer value in the set {⌊(q − 2)/r⌋, . . . , ⌊q/r⌋ + 1}, depending on the value of the offset k. If we assume that r > 2, then we can restrict p ∈ {⌊q/r⌋ − 1, ⌊q/r⌋, ⌊q/r⌋ + 1}.
The weakly periodic functions defined in [13] are one class of functions which can induce such pseudo-periodic states. As we show in this section, we can recover the period even when the state is "almost" periodic. We observe that in the definition of the periodic states above, there is an implicit dependence on the offset k; this offset is usually the outcome of some measurement, and therefore random.
Perturbed geometric sums with missing terms
The following lemma is at the heart of the analysis of the quantum algorithms for infrastructures. It is crucial for understanding the performance of these algorithms. The special case J = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} suffices to bound the probability of the algorithm for computing the circumference. The more general case where J is a proper subset of {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is necessary for the analysis of the quantum algorithm for computing the discrete logarithms.
Lemma 10 (Perturbed geometric sums with missing terms). Let ω be the nth root of unity e 2πi/n , n ≥ 2, θ an arbitrary real-valued function defined on J ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} satisfying the following conditions on θ j and |J |:
where
Then the following inequality holds:
Proof. Triangle inequality and upper bound on the absolute value of the unperturbed geometric sum without missing terms imply
The equality in equation (27) follows from |1 − e iϑ | = |e −iϑ/2 − e iϑ/2 | = 2| sin(ϑ/2)| holding for all ϑ ∈ R. For the inequality in equation (28) we used the fact that | sin ϑ| ≤ |ϑ|, when |ϑ| < π/2.
Subtracting the absolute value of the sum overJ from both sides of equation (28) and dividing by |J | yields
We now bound the "perturbed" geometric sum. To this end, we use some basic ideas from quantum information theory. Define the states |ψ = j∈J |j , the projector P = |e e|, and the diagonal unitary matrix U = diag(ω θ 0 , . . . , ω θ |J |−1 ). Observe that the square of the absolute value of unperturbed geometric sum is equal to P |ψ 2 and that of the perturbed one to P U |ψ 2 . We have
The upper bound on I − U follows by noting that the entries of the diagonal matrix I − U are 1 − e 2πiθ j /n and using the above identity for the absolute value of expressions of this form. Let P |ψ = x and P U |ψ = y. Then equation (30) implies the desired result since
where we used equation (29) in the last step.
We pause to make two observations regarding the application of this result. First, we must ensure that |J |/n ≥ (1 − c δ )/(1 − 2 sin(π/32)) for δ ∈ [0, 1). Second, the choice of |θ j | ≤ n/32, can be improved in that we can tolerate a higher perturbation, depending on the actual value of δ. Although, we retain this bound on θ j throughout this paper for the sake of a clearer exposition, optimizing this bound on θ j based on δ will enable us to obtain better bounds on the success probability of the quantum algorithms.
Presentation and proof of the quantum algorithm
Now we shall give a quantum algorithm for estimating the period of a pseudo-periodic state. In general, these states arise from some periodic functions, therefore the proposed quantum algorithm can be used to estimate the periods of such functions. Theorem 11. Given a pair of pseudo-periodic states whose period S ∈ R is bounded as M ≥ S > 1, then with a probability Ω(1) and in time poly(log S), Algorithm 1 gives a list of real numbers L such that for someŜ ∈ L, we have |S −Ŝ| ≤ 1. Further, |L| = O(poly log S) and the success probability is given by
where M 2 ≤ q < 2M 2 .
Algorithm 1 Approximate period of pseudo-periodic states
Require: A pair of pseudo-periodic states in C q with period S ∈ R, where M is an upper bound on S > 2 and q is an integer such that S 2 ≤ M 2 ≤ q < 2M 2 . 1: For each pseudo-periodic state, apply a Fourier transform over Z q and measure to obtain c and d. Proof. Assume that the pseudo-periodic state is as follows:
where J = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} and p ∈ {⌊q/S⌋ − 1, ⌊q/S⌋, ⌊q/S⌋ + 1}. Since we are Fourier sampling, we may assume without loss of generality, that o = 0. Therefore, the measured distribution will be the same as the one induced by Fourier sampling the following state:
Taking the Fourier transform over Z q we obtain
The Fourier transform at |ℓ has the amplitude
We seek to find a lower bound on the probability of obtaining outcomes ℓ of the form [ 
To bound this probability, we consider the exponent of ω p
The first term is a multiple of p, implying that it can be omitted in the exponent. The factor δ = pSǫ ℓ q in front of j in the second term is less or equal to (1 + S/q)/2 ≤ (1 + 1/S)/2. The absolute value of the sum of the third and fourth terms is less or equal to p/32 provided that m < ⌊S/32⌋. In this case, the phase perturbations θ j caused by these two terms satisfy equation (24a). Further, |J | = p ensures that equation (24b) is also satisfied and we can apply Lemma 10. We conclude that the probability of obtaining |ℓ is
where the last inequality follows from p ≥ ⌊q/S⌋ − 1 ≥ q/S − 2. So the probability of obtaining any "good" ℓ, i.e. m ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊S/32 − 1⌋}, is at least β, where
where we used that ⌊S/32 − 1⌋ ≥ (S/32 − 2). The measured value ℓ is a multiple of q/S rounded to the nearest integer i.e. ℓ = [mq/S] for some m.
Unlike the case of period finding algorithm where the period is integral, the period S of |ψ o,S cannot be reconstructed with Fourier sampling one (pseudo-periodic) quantum state. 
under the assumption that 0 < k ≤ l < ⌊S/32⌋ and q ≥ S 2 . Thus k/l is a convergent of c/d. Since l ≤ ⌊S/32⌋, we only need to compute the convergents c i /d i whose denominators d i are less than ⌊q/32⌋. We now form the list of candidate estimates for S as
As the d i grow exponentially, |L| = O(polylog(|S|)).
Since k/l is a convergent of c/d, we know that there exists an estimateŜ = [kq/c] ∈ L. We now show thatŜ satisfies |S −Ŝ| ≤ 1. Let c = kq/S + ǫ c andŜ = kq/c, where |ǫ c | ≤ 1/2. Then, we can bound |S −Ŝ| as
We now compute a lower bound on the success probability of the algorithm. We have already seen that the probability of a pair of good measurements is given by (38). In order to be able to recover the period S, we require k and l to be coprime. By Lemma 20, the probability that k, l are coprime is at least 1/2. Thus the overall success probability of the algorithm is greater than β 2 /2 = Ω(1).
The algorithm does not return a single value for the period but rather a small list of candidates for the period. This presumes a post processing step by which we can single out the solutions.
Further, we note that the previous algorithm uses a pair of pseudo-periodic states and if these states are being prepared probabilistically, then we must factor that into the success probability of the algorithm.
Quantum algorithm for approximating the circumference
Our goal is to set up pseudo-periodic states whose period is a multiple of the circumference of an infrastructure. Then the quantum algorithm of the preceding section can be applied to extract an integer close to the circumference. With this knowledge, the circumference can be computed to the desired accuracy by a classical algorithm.
Pseudo-periodic states from infrastructures
In section 2.6, we showed that an approximate versionh of h can be computed so that properties P1, P2 are satisfied. For this approximate version to be useful, it is necessary that the f -representations at the evaluation points meet the condition stated in equation (14) . In this subsection, we show how to satisfy this condition which allows us to computeh so that the first component is always correct and the error in the second component is under control. However,h does not induce the periodic states that we discussed in the previous section. To create a periodic quantum state it is essential to work with a "quantized" version ofh. Therefore we introduce the function h N : Z → X × Z by setting
When P2 is satisfied, it is helpful to interpret h N in the following way:
The incorrectness inh cannot be avoided if the evaluation points r are chosen arbitrarily. As already stated in Lemma 8, we assume that the evaluation points are of the form k/L for some large integer L and bounded k. Even so, we cannot evaluate alwaysh correctly for every k. Therefore, we further restrict the evaluation ofh to a subset of the points which are 
But this is still inadequate to satisfy equation (14), as some of the evaluation points could be very close to elements of the infrastructure. So we shift all the evaluation points by a random offset of the form j L , where j is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, . . . , L N − 1}. This is shown in the figure below. The solid lines indicate the shifted evaluation points and they are still of the form k/L. Now we can show that with high probability equation (14) is satisfied and can use Lemma 8 to guarantee thath can be computed with the precision stated in equation (15) .
Suppose we evaluate h N at points i/N + j/L for i ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, where j chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, . . . , L/N − 1}, and L is an integer such that
Then with probability greater or equal to p h , no sampling point i/N + j/L is closer than 1/L to any element x of the I, i.e.,
Proof. By assumption A7 there are at mostk⌈q/N dk⌉ elements of I in the interval [0, q/N ]. There are L/N possible offsets to choose from. Since the offsets are spaced at 1/L, any element x ∈ I can be within a distance of less than 1/2L for at most two offsets. The fraction of offsets that are not useful is given
When L is chosen according to Lemma 12, we have h
We use x instead ofx on purpose to emphasize again that the first component is correct. It is crucial to observe that ⌊f N ⌋ is equal to ⌊f N ⌋. This is because P2 holds and no evaluation point is within 1/L of any element of the infrastructure.
The preceding results imply that h N (i) can be computed efficiently and correctly. 
Next we show that h N when evaluated over a finite interval induces a periodic state with probability greater than or equal to 1/2, if we assume that no sampling point is too close to any element of the infrastructure. Lemma 14. Let N ≥ ⌈2/d min ⌉ and let |ψ = q −1/2 q−1 i=0 |i |h N (i) . We assume that no element of the infrastructure is too close to the sampling points i/N + j/L, where j and L are chosen as in Lemma 12. Then, with probability greater than
measuring the second register of |ψ induces a periodic state with period N R,
where p is equal to one of the values 4 ⌊q/N R⌋ − 1, ⌊q/N R⌋, or ⌊q/N R⌋ + 1.
Proof. Denote the measurement outcome by (x, m). First, we show that if (x, m) satisfies a certain condition, then the resulting post-measurement state is a pseudo-periodic state. Second, we estimate the probability that we obtain such measurement outcome.
Assume that h N (k) = (x, m) for some k ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊N R⌋}. Then, in ℓth period the sampling points are at a distance α ℓ + m ℓ /N for m ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊N bs(x)⌋} from the element x. Under the assumption of Lemma 12,
Consider now the sampling points for the zeroth period and some other period ℓ = 0.
Then, the following cases arise: 1/L ≤ α ℓ ≤ α 0 , and
unless k corresponds to the last sampling point between the elements x and y = bs(x) since in this case
On the one hand, if k does not correspond to the last sampling point between two adjacent elements of I, then for all ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} we have h N (k + ⌊ℓN R⌉) = h N (k). On the other hand, if k corresponds to the last evaluation point between two elements, then the preimage may not contain all ℓ.
We now estimate the probability of obtaining an outcome (x, m) such that h N (k) = (x, m) and the offset k ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊N R⌋} does not correspond to the last evaluation point between any two elements.
There are ⌊N R⌋ + 1 possible offsets in the zeroth period. At most ⌈R/d min ⌉ of these can correspond to last evaluation points between two elements. We know that the preimage of a "good" measurement outcome (x, m) contains at least ⌊q/N R⌋ − 1 elements. So, the probability of obtaining a good measurement outcome is at least
Presentation and proof of the quantum algorithm
Theorem 15 (Estimating the circumference to arbitrary accuracy). Let I be an infrastructure satisfying the assumptions A1-A7. For any δ > 0, there is an efficient Las Vegas algorithm that outputs an estimateR of the circumference R of I such that |R −R| ≤ δ.
Let N ≥ ⌈2/d min ⌉, S = N R, p h the probability of evaluating h N correctly, and p periodic the probability of creating a periodic state, see equation (43). Then, the classical algorithm invokes Algorithm 1 an expected O(1/q success ) number of times, where q success is
The classical computations take poly(log(R), log(1/δ)) time.
Proof. We first create an pseudo-periodic state in C q , where q is chosen as specified by Algorithm 1. We create the superposition
If the conditions of Lemma 12 are satisfied, then |ψ will be created correctly with a probability p h . Then by Lemma 14, measuring the second register of the state results in a periodic state |ψ k,N R with probability ≥ 1/2, where p ∈ {⌊q/S⌋ − 1, ⌊q/S⌋, ⌊q/S⌋ + 1}. Algorithm 1 returns L, a list of candidates for S, which contains an elementŜ which satisfies |S −Ŝ| ≤ 1. The probability of this event is
where p success is defined in equation (32). The factor of p 2 h p 2 periodic is due to the fact that the Algorithm 1 needs to create a pair of the pseudo-periodic states.
Assume that |S −Ŝ| ≤ 1 is present (of course, we do not know this). This is equivalent to |R − R ′ | ≤ 1/N , where R ′ =Ŝ/N . We actually check for a slightly weaker condition namely, |(R − R ′ ) mod R| ≤ 1/N . But this suffices.
Recall that we always choose N ≥ ⌈2/d min ⌉. This implies that either h(R ′ ) = (x 0 , f ) with f ≤ 1 N or h(R ′ ) = (bs −1 (x 0 ), g) with g ≥ ∆ bs (bs −1 (x 0 )) − 1/N . If we evaluateh, the approximate version of h, at R ′ with precision δ prec ≤ 1 2N , then it remains the case that we can only obtain either (x 0 ,f ) or (bs −1 (x 0 ),g). If so we can conclude that |R − R ′ mod R| ≤ 1/N . Now assume that |(R − R ′ ) mod R| > 1/N holds. In this case, we may or may not encounter bs −1 (x 0 ) or x 0 by evaluatingh at R ′ .
Because our test actually checked for |(R − R ′ ) mod R| ≤ 1/N , we could have some spurious solutions when R ′ is a multiple of R. If this is the case, then we return the smallest such R ′ as satisfying |R − R ′ | ≤ 1/N . We then obtain an estimate for R as follows.
Once we have encountered bs −1 (x 0 ) or x 0 , we can computeh(R ′ ) with precision δ/2. If we obtain (bs −1 (x 0 ),g), then we setR
where we compute the distance ∆ bs with precision δ/2. If we obtain (x 0 ,f ), then we setR = R ′ −f . All these computations can be carried out in poly(log(R), log(1/δ) time.
The expected number of times we have to invoke the quantum algorithm to encounter bs −1 (x 0 ) or x 0 is clearly at most 1/q success .
There is a subtle point worth spelling out. In each run of the algorithm, there are two evaluations of h N . We assume that the same random shift is used in both these evaluations and in any subsequent O(1/q success ) runs. Only if the algorithm fails in all these runs do we change the offset and repeat the process.
Finally, it can be easily verified for sufficiently large S, say S ≥ 256, the lower bound on the success probability is greater than a constant, irrespective of the size of the problem.
The proposed algorithm when specialized to number fields improves upon [13] in the following aspects. The probability of success of the proposed algorithm is lower bounded by equation (32) which is a constant 10 −5 as opposed to [13] for which the success probability decreases as Ω(1/ log 4 (M )), where M ≥ N R and is lower than 10 −9 , see [13, Claim 3.5 and Lemma 3.4] therein. As the expression indicates the success probability of the algorithm decreases with increasing circumference and the performance gap with respect to our algorithm increases. Our lower bound is better than the lower bound of [19] , namely 2 −26 . Our result also implies fewer repetitions to boost the probability of success, thereby lowering the complexity of the algorithm. In addition, the proposed algorithm requires a smaller Quantum Fourier transform, thereby lowering the number of qubits and circuit complexity.
Quantum algorithm for solving the generalized discrete logarithm problem in infrastructures
In this section we give a quantum algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem. Given an element x of an infrastructure I = (X, d) we are required to find the distance of x, namely d(x).
The function that is of interest in the computation of the discrete log problem is given by g(a, b) : Z × R → I × R where g(a, r) = a · (x, 0) + h(r). By Lemma 9 we can computeg the approximate version of g, so that it satisfies properties P1, and P2.
As in the circumference case, we evaluateg at carefully selected points to ensure that the first component is always correct and quantize the second component. This resulting function is
The first component of g N is correct provided that equation (14) is satisfied for all evaluation points of g N , i.e., none of the evaluation points are closer than 1/L to any element of the infrastructure.
As in the case of h N , we achieve this with high probability by applying a random shift of the form j/L. The following lemma shows how to find a suitable L. Lemma 16 (Offset for DLOG). Suppose I is an infrastructure that satisfies the assumptions A1-7.
Let A ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , A − 1} and B ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊RN ⌋ − 1}. Let
Let j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L/N − 1} be chosen uniformly at random. Then, the probability that
holds for all (a, b) ∈ A × B and all y ∈ X is greater or equal to p g .
Proof. Consider a fixed a ∈ A, then all the points ad x + b/N + j/L are contained in the interval
This interval contains at mostk⌈(R − 1/N )/dk⌉ elements y ∈ X since its length is ⌊RN − 1⌋/N ≤ (R − 1/N ). Observe that no y ∈ X can be closer than 1/L to any evaluation point of the above form for more than two offsets.
Hence, if we consider all a ∈ A, then at most 2Ak⌈(R − 1/N )/dk⌉ offsets are bad. Assuming L as stated above, this implies that the probability that there is at least one element and at least one evaluation point that are closer than 1/L to each other is at most (
We always computeR with sufficiently high precision so that |R − R| < 1/(2N ) holds. Then, we haveR > R − 1/2N and a suitable choice for L would be 2Ak R /dk /(1 − p g ) N .
In the quantum algorithm for approximating the circumference, we encounter superpositions of the form:
where A x,m has the special form {⌊k + jRN ⌉ : j = 0, . . . , p} and (x, m) is equal to h N (k).
A somewhat similar type of quantum state appears in the discrete logarithm problem. A major difference is that it involves a function of two variables
where A y,ℓ is now the fiber over (y, ℓ) ∈ im g N , i.e., g N (a, b) = (y, ℓ) for (a, b) ∈ A y,ℓ .
The intuition based on Lemma 6, which characterizes the kernel of the perfect function g, suggests that the elements in A y,ℓ lie "close" to a line whose slope encodes the distance of the element x. This statement is proved in Lemma 17, which establishes the exact relation between a and b for g N . Lemma 18, establishes upper and lower bounds on the size of the preimage of (y, ℓ).
The intuition based on the quantum algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in finite cyclic groups suggests that we can extract the slope by Fourier sampling. This statement is proved in Theorem 19. 
For each (y, ℓ) ∈ g N (A × B), the preimage g
where A y,ℓ ⊆ A and assuming that a random shift of j/L has been applied to the evaluation points, the values b a satisfy the condition
The cardinality of the image satisfies the inequalities
Proof. Let (y, ℓ) ∈ g N (A × B) be arbitrary. Suppose that (a, b a ) ∈ g −1 N (y, ℓ). Then we must have
This constraint on γ a is due to the fact that none of the sampling points are within a distance of less than 1/L from the elements of the infrastructure.
The second component ℓ is bounded from above by
since the inequality
holds for all (a, b a ) with g N (a, b a ) = (y, ℓ). This implies that the number of images whose first component is equal to y is at most N ∆ bs (y) + 1. Summing over all elements of the infrastructure yields the upper bound RN +R/d min . We can improve this to
A condition similar to equation (54) has been established in [13] for the principal ideal problem. The condition as derived in [13] may not be satisfied for some infrastructures. Therefore, we relax this constraint and clarify certain crucial assumptions on the size of the preimage in Lemma 18. Lemma 18. Let A and B be as in Lemma 17. Consider the probability distribution p = (p y,ℓ ) on g N (A × B) where the probabilities of the elementary events (y, ℓ) are given by
Let X be the random variable that takes on the value |g −1 N (y, ℓ)| if the event (y, ℓ) occurs. Then, we have
for any κ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The expected value E[X] is bounded from below by
We used that the sum p 2 y,ℓ is minimized when probability distribution is uniform on g N (A × B) and
. Then, we must have
since X is bounded by |A| from above. The desired lower bound on t follows now easily.
Theorem 19. Let I be an infrastructure containing at least 3 elements and satisfying the axioms A1-A7. For all x ∈ X, Algorithm 2 returns an integerd x such that |d x −d x | ≤ 1, where d x is the distance of x.
Let p g be the probability of correctly evaluating g N and κ a real number with (1 − sinc(3/4))/(1 − 2 sin(π/32)) < κ < 1 − 2/(2q + 1). Then, the success probability of the algorithm is Ω(1) and at least
where B = R N and q is chosen as in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Generalized discrete logarithm. 3:
Fourier sample over Z A × Z B to obtain (h 1 , k 1 ) and (h 2 , k 2 ). 6: Find integers s, t such that sk 1 + tk 2 = 1, using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Proof. We compute an estimateR such that
We now show that there is an efficient method that determines positive integers B = R N and
To do this, we bound this deviation by
The efficient method in Lemma 21 gives us a convergent p/q with q ≤ 4M such that
The numerator p has the form R ⌈2/d min ⌉q . The bound in equation (62) and the form of the numerator directly imply that N = q⌈2/d min ⌉ has the desired properties. Both terms in equation (61) are smaller than 1/4 for this choice.
Observe that B −2 = R N −2 ≤ ⌊RN ⌋−1 becauseR has been computed with such high precision. We define the sets B = {0, 1, . . . , B − 2} and A = {0, 1, . . . , A − 1}.
We create the superposition 1 |A||B| a∈A b∈B |a |b |g N (a, b) .
We know that with probability greater or equal to p g all the values g N (a, b) are correct.
We measure the third register. Denote the outcome by (y, ℓ). Lemma 18 guarantees that |A y,ℓ | ≥ κ|A| holds with probability greater or equal to
Since N = q⌈2/d min ⌉, we can bound p κ
where we used the assumption that I has at least 3 elements and therefore R > 3d min , and N R > 6q.
Lemma 17 implies that the post-measurement state has the form
and there exists a unique b a for each a ∈ A y,ℓ such that
where 1/L ≤ γ a ≤ 1/N − 1/L. We rewrite the condition on b a as
We apply the quantum Fourier transform over Z A × Z B to the first registers and obtain the super-
The amplitude of the term |h |k is given by
The exponent of ω A in the previous equation is
The term M k∆ is independent of a and can be dropped from the exponent since it does not change the probability distribution.
We now show that we obtain a sample (h, k) such that
holds with high probability. 5 As shown previously, N is chosen such that M N R − M NR = η with |η| ≤ 1 2 . To simplify the notation, we use x to denote the distance d x of the element x throughout the rest of the proof. The 5 The reason that we consider samples that have this particular form is as follows. Rearranging the terms in the exponent we see that the sum is dominated by the terms ah − (kdx/R)M N R + k⌊(adx + γa + ba/N j/L)/R⌋M N R. The exponent can be approximated as ah − (kdx/R − ⌊adx/R⌋)M N R. Therefore, the probability of (h, k) which is determined by the geometric sum 
The (constant) factor δ := ǫ h − ηζ in front of a is less than 3/4 in absolute value (ǫ h ≤ 1 2 , ζ < 1 and η < 1 2 ). Assume we measure k ≤ ⌊B/64⌋ − 1. Then, for each a the term θ a := (ηδ a + M N γ a )k is less than A/32 in absolute value (since |δ a | < 2 and |γ a N | < 1).
We can now apply Lemma 10 to bound the probability of measuring (h, k) as in equation (72); we denote this probability by p hk . Note that A corresponds to n, the summation index a to j and A y,ℓ to the set J in the Lemma 10.
The probability p hk is bounded from below by 
where c δ is as in Lemma 10.
The probability of any good pair (h, k) (with the restriction k ≤ ⌊B/64⌋ − 1) is bounded from below by κ 1 − 2 sin(π/32) − 1 − sinc(3/4) 1 κ
where we used that |A y,ℓ | ≥ κ|A| and ⌊B/64 − 1⌋ ≥ B/64 − 2.
We now show how to obtain an estimate of the distance of x from two good pairs (h 1 , k 1 ) and (h 2 , k 2 ) with the additional restriction that k 1 , k 2 are coprime. This is based on the method in [13] .
We have h i = k i xN M − ⌊k i x/R⌋RN M + ǫ i with |ǫ i | ≤ algorithm. Let r = (sh 1 + th 2 )/M N , then we have
where ǫ r = (sǫ 1 + tǫ 2 )/M N . Since |s|, |t| ≤ max{k 1 , k 2 }, and k 1 , k 2 ≤ R N /32, it follows that ǫ r = The probability of measuring two good samples (h 1 , k 1 ) and (h 2 , k 2 ) such that k 1 , k 2 are coprime is given by
where p g is the probability of evaluating g N successfully.
We make the following observations regarding the success probability of the quantum algorithm. First, a simpler lower bound on the success probability can be obtained without having to maximize over κ in equation (57), by evaluating this expression at κ = (κ 1 + κ 2 )/2, where κ 1 = (1 − c δ )/(1 − 2 sin(π/32)) and κ 2 = 1 − 2/(2q + 1). We also note the expression can be further simplified to be completely independent of of the size of the infrastructure as follows.
Second, under the assumption that R ≥ 256 and q ≥ 8, we can bound (1/64 − 2/B) ≥ 1/128 and 2/(2q + 1) ≤ 1/8, and the lower bound on success probability simplifies to a constant independent of the problem size. Although the expressions for the success probability may appear to be a little unwieldy, we hope they provide insight into the various factors affecting the success probability.
Third, we can boost the success probability (strictly speaking, the lower bound on it) by increasing q.
Fourth, we can truly improve upon the success probability by extending the set of usable observations (h 1 , k 1 ) and (h 2 , k 2 ). Currently, we require that k i < ⌊B/64⌋, but this can be relaxed significantly.
by considering the complementary event.
We now prove a result related to continued fractions. The reader can find more details about continued fractions in [3] . Lemma 21. Let p i /q i denote the convergents of a real number r ∈ R, for i ∈ N. Then for any given constant c > 1, there exists a convergent p ℓ /q ℓ such that |r − p ℓ /q ℓ | < 1/cq ℓ and q ℓ ≤ c.
Proof. Since c > 1 = q 0 and q i form a monotonically increasing sequence for i > 1, there exists such a convergent p ℓ /q ℓ such that q ℓ ≤ c < q ℓ+1 unless r has a finite continued fraction expansion with all the q i < c. If the latter case occurs, then it follows that there exists a convergent p ℓ /q ℓ such that r = p ℓ /q ℓ therefore for this convergent |r − p/q| = 0 < 1/c and the statement of the lemma holds. Otherwise, r has a continued fraction expansion such that q ℓ ≤ c < q ℓ+1 . We know that the convergents satisfy the relation
.
Therefore, we must have
where we used the fact that q ℓ+1 > c.
